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Abstract 
Cloud-assisted Cognitive Internet of Things has powerful data analytics 
abilities based on the computing and data storage capabilities of cloud virtual 
machines, which makes protecting virtual machine filesystem very 
important for the whole system security. Agentless periodic filesystem 
monitors are optimal solutions to protect cloud virtual machines because of 
the secure and low-overhead features. However, most of the periodic 
monitors usually scan all of the virtual machine filesystem or protected files 
in every scanning poll, so lots of secure files are scanned again and again even 
though they are not corrupted. In this paper, we propose a novel agentless 
periodic filesystem monitor framework for virtual machines with different 
image formats to improve the performance of agentless periodic monitors. 
Our core idea is to minimize the scope of the scanning files in both file 
integrity checking and virus detection. In our monitor, if a file is considered 
secure, it will not be scanned when it has not been modified. Since our 
monitor only scans the newly created and modified files, it can check less files 
than other filesystem monitors. To that end, we propose two monitor 
methods for different types of virtual machine disks to reduce the number of 
scanning files. For virtual machine with single disk image, we hook the 
backend driver to capture the disk modification information. For virtual 
machine with multiple copy-onwrite images, we leverage the copy-on-write 
feature of QCOW2 images to achieve the disk modification analysis. In 
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addition, our system can restore and remove the corrupted files. The 
experimental results show that our system is effective for both Windows and 
Linux virtual machines with different image formats and can reduce the 
number of scanning files and scanning time. 
Keywords: Filesystem monitor, Minimized scanning, Hooking backend 
driver, Copy-on-write image analysis. 
 
1. Introduction 
Assisted by cloud computing, Cognitive Internet of Things (CIoT) has 
some new capabilities such as machine learning and data mining. Since the 
huge amount of data generated by IoT is stored and processed by virtual 
machines (VMs) in cloud, the VM security, especially VM filesystem security, 
is very important for the whole CIoT system. Attackers usually tamper with 
critical files (e.g., system or service configuration files, system logs and user 
data) to steal critical data, e.g., security-critical keys, which can impair the 
whole system significantly, even if key management schemes [1, 2, 3] are 
properly established. In addition, attackers could also upload and execute 
malwares for long-time control. So, checking file integrity and detecting 
malicious files are important for the cloud-assisted CIoT system. Traditional 
filesystem monitors leverage agents running in operating system (OS) to 
perform file scanning. Since these agents are usually user space processes or 
kernel modules, in-VM agents could be detected or even be subverted by 
attackers. 
Virtualization gives people a novel approach to reduce these risks. In the 
virtualization architecture, the virtual machine monitor (VMM) provides 
virtualization service for guest VMs and can access the hardware state of 
them. Since the VMM has the highest privilege and isolates different VMs, 
agentless monitors running in the VMM or a secure VM are more secure and 
transparent. This monitor approach is called as virtual machine 
introspection (VMI) [4]. Because of the security and transparency, agentless 
monitors are optimal for cloud computing. 
Agent-less filesystem monitor tools can be classified into two categories: 
real-time monitors and periodic monitors. Real-time monitors [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
check access policy and file integrity in real time, most of which are usually 
achieved by hooking the guest VM system calls. Since system calls are 
invoked with high frequency, these real-time monitors always introduce 
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performance overhead to monitored VMs. As a result, real-time monitors 
are unpractical to be used in cloud. Agent-less periodic monitor tools [10, 
11] scan the filesystem periodically. They obtain the monitored files outside 
and then check the integrity by comparing the current content of them with 
previously gathered. To detect malwares, they calculate the file’s signature 
and check it based on signature database. Although these approaches 
cannot protect files and detect malwares in real time, they introduce very 
low overhead to the monitored VMs. Therefore, agentless periodic monitor 
tools are widely used in the cloud [12, 13]. However, since all of the 
monitored files are scanned in every poll cycle, these monitors check lots of 
secure files again and again, which is needless. 
To meet the filesystem monitoring requirements of cloud computing (e.g., 
high performance, security and low overhead), we propose a novel agentless 
periodic VM filesystem monitor framework, which reduces the scanning file 
number and improves the performance. The core idea is that our monitor 
only scans the modified or newly created files in every poll. So, if the secure 
files are not modified, they will not be scanned again and again. For 
protecting critical files, if the protected files are not modified, we need not to 
check the integrity of them. For virus scanning, since a VM has lots of system 
files and most of them are unmodified, checking only modified files can 
effectively reduce the scanning payload. As a periodic out-of-VM monitor, our 
system is transparent and secure. 
To determine if a file needs to be scanned, we check if it has dirty blocks 
or clusters. If a file is modified or newly created, the disk blocks (Linux EXT4) 
or clusters (Windows NTFS) belong to it will be modified. In this paper, We 
call the dirty Linux blocks and dirty Windows clusters as dirty blocks. There 
are two main kinds of VM image formats: single image (RAW or QCOW2) and 
multiple copy-on-write images (QCOW2). Single-image VM has only one disk 
image, and there is no secure mechanism to log the disk modification 
information events. We design a backend-driver-based monitor, which hooks 
the backend driver to intercept the disk modification information with very 
low overhead, to obtain the dirty blocks. Multiple-image VM has a base image 
and a copy-on-write (COW) overlay. The overlay records the disk 
modification information after the VM initialized. By analyzing the overlay, 
we propose an overlay-based monitor, which can obtain the dirty blocks. Our 
system has high scalability supporting both Linux and Windows VMs. To 
enhance the system, we propose several methods to restore the modified 
files and remove the malicious files for cloud users. 
The main contributions of our work are listed as follows: 
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• We propose an agentless high-performance VM filesystem monitoring 
method for CSPs to reduce the scanning file number in every poll. As an 
out-of-VM periodic tool, our monitor is transparent and secure with 
very low overhead. 
• We design the monitor for single-image and multi-image VMs 
separately, which supports Linux and Windows operating systems. In 
addition, we propose several methods to recover the modified files and 
remove the malicious files. 
• After implementation, the effectiveness and performance are evaluated 
extensively. The results show that our system can reduce the scanning 
file numbers significantly. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the 
related work. The threat model and system overview is described in Section 
3. Section 4 gives the single-image monitor, and the multiple-image monitor 
is presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses how to handle the abnormal 
files. Section 7 evaluates the effectiveness and performance of our system. 
Conclusions and future work are given in Section 8. 
2. Related work 
Many efforts have been proposed to check file integrity because of its 
importance for the security of IoT ecosystems, including cloud [14], wireless 
sensor networks [15], mobile computing [16, 17], etc.  
In general, traditional filesystem monitor runs as a kernel module or an 
agent in the OS. For example, XenRIM [18] runs in Xen environment where 
the agents run in VMs to send messages to the server running in Dom0. 
Unlike XenRIM, ICAR [19] runs as a kernel module to check file integrity, 
which can restore the original version of the modified file. Unfortunately, 
these in-VM approaches are not secure because they can be detected and 
attacked by the coexisting malwares. 
With the development of virtual machine introspection (VMI) [4] 
technique, agentless security tools are widely be used because of the security 
and transparency features, such as virtual machine monitoring [20, 21], virus 
analysis [22], etc. In addition, CloudVMI [23] provides the VMI service for 
cloud users. 
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In general, there are two agentless filesystem monitoring ways: real-time 
monitoring and periodic monitoring. Real-time monitors protect files in real 
time. Most of them intercept file operations during the VM execution process 
to check rules. For instance, Flogger [5] captures VM file operations and then 
records the events into log files. Filesafe [6] captures file operation request 
to disk blocks and checks whether the request violates the policies. vMon [7] 
hooks QEMU [24] I/O handlers to do secure check and bridges the semantic 
gap between the block level and filesystem level by designing a File-to-Block 
Mapper. Different from these monitors, CFWatcher [8] is a target-based real-
time file monitor, which only intercepts file operations of monitored files. 
However, these monitors are difficult to be used in practical cloud, because 
they introduce high overheads to the monitored VMs. 
In comparison, agentless periodic monitors compare the file content with 
the original version periodically to detect file modifications and malicious 
files. CFMT [10] periodically checks the protected file integrity by comparing 
every protected file’s checksum with the original one stored in the protected 
file itself. [11] checks file integrity with low security level by comparing them 
with secure database. Periodic monitors introduce low overheads to the 
monitored VMs, so they are widely used in the cloud, such as VMware vShield 
Endpoint [12] and Trend Micro Deep Security [13]. Since all of the monitored 
files are scanned in every poll cycle, the monitors will scan lots of files which 
does not need to scan. 
Different from the existing works above, this paper aims to propose a 
high-performance agentless filesystem monitor to reduce the scanning file 
number of periodic monitors. 
3. Threat Model and System Overview 
3.1. Assumptions and Threat Model 
In our system, we assume that the VMM is secure and can protect both 
itself and our system running in it from tampering by the in-VM attacks, 
which are able to subvert the target VM’s kernel. In addition, the privileged 
VM (Dom0) is secure. The VMM can isolate the privileged VM from the 
untrusted VM and protect the privileged VM from being attacked by the 
untrusted VM. The communication channel between VMM and Dom0 should 
also be secure. 
The untrusted VM is secure when it is initialized, and the initial files in it 
are secure. But the VM could be attacked or controlled by malwares after it is 
initialized. Some rootkits may subvert the VM’s kernel to hide some 
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processes and files. Therefore, the system calls related with the untrusted 
VM’s file operations (such as OPEN, READ and WRITE) are untrusted. 
Furthermore, the untrusted VM’s kernel memory and disk could be accessed 
and subverted by attackers. 
3.2. Core Idea and Challenges 
To improve the performance of periodic VM filesystem monitor, we 
minimize the number of scanning files of every poll cycle. Our core method 
is to reduce the number of scanning files by making the periodic monitor only 
scan the modified or newly created files. Therefore, the file scanner can scan 
less files in every poll, which will improve the monitor’s performance 
significantly. To that end, the monitor should be able to identify if a file is 
modified or newly created. However, this task faces several challenges. 
• Effectiveness. We need to ensure the identification results of modified 
or newly files are correct and usable. Most of common VM filesystems 
can record the file modification date into the file’s meta data, which can 
be used to identify the modified files by checking if the modification 
time is after that of the last scanning. However, the meta data is not 
secure, because it is maintained by VM’s filesystem. If we want to use 
this data directly, we need to make sure the data is recorded correctly 
and has not been modified by attackers. To that end, we need to ensure 
the VM’s kernel and filesystem integrity and prevent file meta data from 
being tampered with in real time. But, it is not easy to do that. In 
addition. many kernel protection systems introduce extra overhead to 
the protected VM. So, we need to find another secure way to identify 
which file has been created or modified. 
• Performance. The performance of our file monitor should be better 
than that of traditional file monitor which scans all of the filesystem or 
protected files in every poll. In addition, our monitor should not 
introduce much overhead to the protected running VM. The 
unacceptable overhead will make the system not practicable in real-
world cloud computing. 
• Security and transparency. The monitor should be prevented from 
being detected and attacked. As mentioned in Section 3, the VMs could 
be totally controlled by attackers. Our monitor should be secure and be 
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able to work properly in this environment. In addition, the VM 
operating system does not need to cooperate with the file monitor. 
• Scalability. The monitor needs to support most of VM operating 
systems without many modifications. 
3.3. System Overview 
To address these challenges, we propose two high-performance 
monitoring methods for different types of VM images, which are single image 
and multiple copy-on-write-based images. Most of cloud VMs use single 
images (RAW format). The single image stores all of the VM’s filesystem. For 
these VMs, we design a backend-driver-based disk change tracker, which can 
record all of the disk changes in real time with very low overhead. By 
analyzing these changes, the monitor can identify the modified or newly 
created files (dirty files) directly. Copy-on-write-based images usually have 
at least two images for one VM. The base image stores the initial filesystem 
of VM, and the copy-on-write overlay stores all of the disk changes. In private 
cloud, this kind of images can instantiate lots of same VMs to build cluster 
rapidly. For these VMs, we propose an overlay-based analysis approach to 
detect the dirty files from the overlay automatically. 
The system architecture is shown in Figure 1. There are three layers in 
our system, which are described as follows: 
1. Monitor Layer - is responsible for scanning the images of different 
kinds of VMs outside to detect malicious files and check the integrity of 
protected files. By leveraging the collected disk modification 
information of VMs, it can perform minimized scanning. 
2. Data Layer - contains the cryptographic hashes of protected files and 
backup copies of them. In the scanning stage, the monitor module 
leverages the cryptographic hashes to detect the modification of file 
content. The backup copies of protected files are used for recovering 
the modified files. 
3. Utility Layer - equips the users with management tools and the warning 
output consoles. 
The monitor module is implemented in each physical server to analyze 
different types of VM images, and is controlled by the controller module. To 
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analyze the images of single-image VMs, the monitor module needs to get the 
disk modification information by hooking the VM backend driver. For 
 
Figure 1: System overview 
 
Figure 2: The architecture of monitoring single-image VMs 
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the multiple-image VMs, the monitor module analyzes both the base image 
and the overlay of each VM to perform monitoring. The data layer and utility 
layer are implemented in the central management server for users to 
configure and manage the monitor. When the user configures the protected 
files, the system saves the hashes the files. If the files to be protected are not 
in the base image, the backup copies of them will be stored in the data layer 
for restoring files. The detection results will be sent to the users for further 
operations. Our system provides serval ways to delete malicious files and 
restore protected files. 
4. Monitoring Single-image Virtual Machines 
4.1. Core approach 
The format of most single-image VMs is RAW, which uses only one image 
to store VM filesystem. As discussed in Section 3.2, we cannot directly use the 
modification date recorded in the VM filesystem to identify the dirty files. To 
meet the secure and high-performance requirements, we design a driver-
based disk modification tracker. This tracker works in the hypervisor’s VM 
disk I/O backend driver and captures the modification information of VM 
disk with low overhead. Based on the disk modification information, the file 
scanner can identify which file is modified or newly created directly. By only 
checking these files, the file scanner’s performance will be improved. 
The system architecture is shown in Figure 2. There are three key 
modules in the monitor: modified backend disk driver, disk modification 
recorder and file scanner. The modified backend disk driver provides the disk 
I/O service for VMs and captures all of the modification information. The 
captured information will be transferred to the disk modification recorder 
module. The recorder leverages this information to generate the dirty block 
map. By analyzing this map, the file scanner can only check the modified and 
newly created files in every poll. 
4.2. Generating dirty block map 
To capture the dirty blocks, we modify the original VM backend disk 
driver to make it possible to intercept the VM disk block-level I/O operations. 
The most popular two open-source virtualization hypervisors - KVM and 
Xen both leverage QEMU to emulate the VM disk. It supports most of 
mainstream formats, such as RAW and QCOW2. When a VM writes or reads 
a block, the request will be transferred by KVM to QEMU’s related I/O driver. 
Since QEMU leverages files in Dom0 to emulate the VM disk, the driver 
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converts the block-level I/O request to file I/O request. Then, it reads or 
writes the corresponding image file which stores the VM disk. 
Our monitor hooks the writing operation in the driver to obtain two 
important data: offset and bytes. The offset value is the operation’s start 
address, and the other value indicates the length of the writing content. For 
instance, if the offset and bytes are 1234567890 and 4096 respectively, the 
driver will write 4096 bytes at the address of 1234567890 of the disk image. 
After intercepting these two values, the driver stores them in the native pre-
allocated memory. To that end, we allocate a memory area for every VM when 
the VM is started. When the driver is invoked to handle the writing request, 
it will store these two data as one record in the native memory area. The 
types of these two data are both unsigned long long, so one record occupies 
16 bytes. The native memory space can store 100,000 records, occupying 1.6 
MB, which is very small for a cloud computing server. Since the data capture 
is performed during the driver execution, we only record these data and do 
not process them to reduce the overhead. 
Then, the records need to be transferred to the modification recorder. The 
modification recorder runs as a process in Dom0. There are several ways can 
be used to transfer data between processes, such as shared memory, 
semaphore and message queue. We first select shared memory to transfer 
data, because its performance is very high. The procedure is shown in Figure 
3. The shared memory is established when the VM is started, and its size is 
6.4 MB. The memory area is used as a circular queue and can store four 
 
Figure 3: Using shared memory to transfer data 
entries, each of which can store 100,000 records. The shared memory can be 
read and written by the driver and the recorder. When the driver’s native 
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memory is full, it puts all of the records in the tail entry of the queue and then 
marks the entry as full. Then, it cleans the records in native memory and 
sends a signal to the recorder. Finally, the driver continues to handle other 
requests. When the recorder receives the signal, it reads all of the full entries 
from the queue and then marks them as empty. 
Besides the shared memory, we leverage files to transfer data when the 
shared memory is not enough to work. Since the size of the queue is fixed, if 
the recorder cannot clean the queue in time, the queue will be full. This case 
may happened when the driver handles a huge amount of requests in a very 
short time. When the queue is full, the driver needs to use another way to 
transfer data instead of waiting, because waiting will suspend the VM 
execution and cause high overhead. In this case, we leverage files to transfer 
the data. Since the size of files can be considered unlimited, all of the data can 
be transferred by leveraging files. When the native memory is full, the driver 
forks a new subprocess, which can inherit the records from the parent 
process, to write the data into a file. Then, the driver cleans the native 
memory and continues to handle other requests. The new subprocess writes 
100,000 records in a file and then exits. Since the overhead of forking a new 
process is lower than that of writing files, the driver’s performance will not 
be impacted significantly. In this case, the disk modification recorder needs 
to read files to get the records and then remove the files. 
Based on the received records, the modification recorder generates a 
dirty block map for each VM before the file scanner starts. The dirty block 
map is an array, and every element of it is bool type, representing the state of 
a block. If a element’s value is true, it indicates the corresponding block is 
dirty. Every block’s state can be expressed as dirty block[block address] = 
true / false. For instance, the block (cluster) size of NTFS and EXT4 is 4096 
byte. If the VM disk is configured as 10 GB, there are 2.56 M elements in the 
array, and the array size is 2.56 MB. Converting the records to the dirty block 
map is to improve the performance of file scanner. When the file scanner 
wants to check if a block is modified, it can use the address to check the state 
of it directly. 
To convert the records to the dirty block map, the recorder first calculates 
the block address of each record by leveraging the offset obtained by the 
driver. There is a header at the beginning of each QEMU image, which is about 
1MB (2,048 sectors). The VM disk data is stored after the header in the image. 
So, the block address can be calculated by (offset-header)/4096. The length 
of content is also important, because some operations write many blocks in 
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a single request. For instance, if the length is 40960, ten blocks will be 
modified. So, if the length is not 4096, the recorder calculates the number of 
blocks and then marks the following several blocks as dirty blocks. The 
recorder processes all of the records to generate the dirty map. 
4.3. File scanner 
Our file scanner is a periodic system, which scans the VM filesystem from 
outside. Since all of the VM disk images are stored in Dom0 as normal files, 
our file scanner reads these image files in Dom0 to access the VM disks. To 
scan the files in the VM disk, our scanner reconstructs the filesystem of the 
VM and then build a file-to-block mapper for the file to be scanned. The file-
to-block mapper obtains the relationship between the file and the blocks of 
its content. Before describe the file-to-block mapper, we first present the 
workflow of file scanner. The procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. File array 
is the list of files to be scanned. If we want to scan the whole VM filesystem, 
the file array will include all of the VM files. Dirty block map is generated by 
the disk modification recorder, which contains the state of every VM blocks. 
After obtaining the block addresses of the target file, the file scanner checks 
if the blocks contain dirty blocks. If a file has dirty blocks, it will be scanned. 
Otherwise, the file is secure. 
Algorithm 1 File scanning algorithm 
Input: file array, dirty block map 
Output: result array 
1: flag=False, empty(result array) 
2: for file in file array do 
3: addr array=get content block address(file) 
4: for addr in addr array do 
5: if check(addr, dirty block map) == True then 
6: flag=True 
7: break 
8: else 
9: continue 
10: if flag==True then 
11: result array.add(scan(file)) 
12: flag=False 
13: else 
14: result array.add(Secure) 
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15: return result array 
 
The file-to-block mapper is responsible for getting a file’s content blocks 
and their addresses (the third line in Algorithm 1). According to different 
types of VM filesystems, the file-to-block mapper works in different ways. 
To build the relationship for Linux VM filesystem, we explore the Linux 
EXT4 filesystem. The EXT4 also called fourth extended filesystem is widely 
used by different Linux operating systems, such as Ubuntu and Debian. In the 
filesystem, every file and directory has its own data and metadata (inode), 
which are both recorded in the disk. To find a file in the disk, we need to 
follow up the front-to-back directories of the corresponding file path. Each 
directory has a list consisting of directory entries, associating subfile names 
with their inode numbers. A subdirectory is recorded in the content of its 
parent directory by storing the name and the corresponding inode number 
in its directory entry. After finding a file’s inode, we can obtain the content of 
it by analyzing its inode. For instance, when we want to read the file 
“/root/test”, we need first to read the directory “/” to find the subdirectory 
“root”, and finally obtain the file “test”. To read the file, we find its content 
blocks, which addresses are stored in the inode structure. The inode 
structure can store 15 block addresses, which is not enough for big files. So, 
these 15 blocks are classified into four types (direct blocks, indirect blocks, 
double indirect blocks and triple indirect blocks) to store more data. By 
analyzing these blocks, we can obtain a file’s content block addresses. 
For Windows VM filesystem, we explore the NTFS filesystem[25], which 
is widely used in Windows. In NTFS, all of the directories, files and their 
metadata are recorded as entries in the Master File Table (MFT). Each file (or 
directory) in MFT consists of a list of attributes. Every attribute has an 
attribute type, an optional attribute name, and a value. The file data is stored 
in the value of a certain attribute of the file. The attribute can be classified as 
resident attribute and non-resident attribute. A resident attribute’s value is 
smaller than an MFT record in size, and the value will be stored within the 
attribute itself. In comparison, the non-resident attribute’s value is stored as 
data runs because it is larger than an MFT record. The data attribute of a file 
could be resident or non-resident according to its size. When the attribute is 
resident, the file data is stored in the MFT record. Otherwise, it will be stored 
in other blocks with the address recorded in the attribute’s run list. 
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Our file-to-block mapper can achieve the reconstruction automatically 
with the help of libguestfs [26], which is an open-source tool for accessing 
and analyzing VM disks. 
The file scanner can be used to check VM file integrity and detect 
malicious files. As discussed in Section 3.1, we can consider that the 
unmodified files are secure, so they do not need to be scanned. For the 
modified and newly created files, we calculate the hashes and compare them 
with the secure ones. To check the security of a file with dirty blocks, we 
leverage an anti-virus software to help us. If a file is abnormal, we can handle 
it, which methods are described in Section 6.1 and 6.2. 
4.4. Performance and security analysis 
Our single-image VM filesystem scanner is effective, high-performance 
and secure with low overhead. 
The disk modification information captured by the QEMU I/O backend 
driver is effective, because the information is collected outside and cannot be 
subverted. Even though the VM is controlled by attackers, the rootkits and 
malwares running in the target VM can only hide the files inside the VM. Our 
file scanner is designed to be a periodic file scanner, so we do not consider 
the case that the file is subverted only in VM’s file cache and the modification 
is not written to disk. As soon as the target VM invokes a disk I/O request, 
our backend driver will capture it. Since our monitor is agentless and works 
in the secure VM, the security of it can be guaranteed by the VMM. 
The file scanning process is high-performance. As described in Section 4.3, 
the file scanner reconstructs the VM filesystem and then checks if the target 
file to be scanned is modified or newly created before the scanning. The 
reconstruction and checking processes do not cause much extra overhead. 
For a traditional file scanner, it reconstructs the VM filesystem and then reads 
the contents for scanning directly. The main difference is the checking 
process. By using the dirty block map, the checking process is an O(1) 
algorithm, which does not read the file’s content. So, the speed of checking is 
faster than that of the scanning. Since most of files in VM are unmodified, our 
scanner’s speed is faster. 
The disk modification tracking is real-time, so we analyze the overhead 
introduced to the target VM. The recorder and file scanner do not need to 
work during the VM execution, so the overhead is only introduced by the 
modified backend driver. Our modified driver records the block information 
in the native memory. This function is performed by several memory writing 
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instructions, so the extra overhead caused by them is very low. When the 
driver needs to transfer the records to the disk modification recorder, it 
copies the records to the shared memory and sends a signal. But, these two 
operations are performed in every one hundred thousand writing requests. 
So the average overhead is also very low. Even though our monitor records 
the modification information in real time, our monitor is not a real-time 
system. Some real-time file monitors (such as vMon[7]) hook the I/O driver 
to check the block address and the block content, but the checking operation 
will reduce the VM I/O performance. The real-time monitors are mainly used 
for access control. Compared with these monitors, our monitor introduces 
less overhead to the target VM. 
5. Monitoring multiple-image virtual machines 
5.1. QCOW image format and core approach 
QCOW is an image format for VM disk used by QEMU, Xen and KVM, which 
stands for ”QEMU Copy On Write” having three versions: qcow, qcow2 and 
qcow3. This format leverages the Copy-On-Write (COW) feature to reduce the 
space in the underlying base disk image, which gives people 
 
Figure 4: Relationships among base images, overlays and VMs 
an ability to create a base image, and create several copy-on-write overlay 
images on top of the base image. When a VM wants to change files, only the 
overlay will be changed and the original data is kept in the base image. By 
leveraging the copy-on-write feature, different VMs can run on only one base 
image with different overlay images, as shown in Figure 4. Since this image 
format is designed for virtual machine disks, it can support a variety of 
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filesystems associated with different guest operating systems. Base images 
and overlays are widely used to instantiate thinly-provisioned VMs rapidly 
and create snapshots and backups of VM disks. As shown in Figure 4, the base 
images are read-only, and all the modifications to disks are saved in the 
overlays in QCOW2 format. As a result, the overlays save all the modifications 
after they are used by VMs, and the size becomes larger and larger. 
The overlay of the QCOW2 image format can record all of the file 
modifications after the VM initialization. Through analyzing the overlays, we 
can obtain all of the modified and created files. Since we assume that all of 
the files in the base image are secure, scanning only the modified and created 
files reduces the workload of filesystem monitor. To that end, we design the 
monitor to reconstruct files in the overlays. Our monitor is designed for Linux 
and Windows VMs separately. 
5.2. Monitoring Linux virtual machines 
For Linux, the relationship between the VM filesystem and the QCOW2 
image is shown in Figure 5. In the Linux filesystem, the new file’s file name 
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Figure 5: Relationships between Linux EXT2 filesystem and QCOW2 image 
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the data offset is recorded in one of the L2 table entries. The QCOW2 image 
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overlay, which means that the original file block is not modified. Otherwise, 
the file is modified or newly-created and is recorded in the QCOW2 image. 
The detailed steps of scanning a file are shown in Figure 6(a). We first 
obtain the protected file’s inode from the VM filesystem based on its file path. 
If the new inode cannot be found, the protected file is deleted and should be 
restored. Otherwise, the file’s inode address can be calculated. Then, we 
check whether the inode object is stored in the overlay. If the inode object is 
not allocated in the overlay, we can ensure that the file is not modified 
because a modified file must have a modified inode object. However, since all 
of the file accesses will change the file’s inode object, a modified inode object 
does not mean that the corresponding file content is modified. If a inode 
object is in the overlay but its file data is not allocated, the file is not modified. 
For the files with data in the overlay, we need to scan the files. 
5.3. Monitoring Windows virtual machines 
To determine whether a file is modified or newly created in Windows VM, 
we also search its data from the overlay. If a file’s data is not recorded in the 
overlay, we need not to check it. The monitoring steps are similar to those of 
monitoring Linux VM, which are shown in Figure 6. First, we need to find the 
attributes of a monitored file by analyzing the VM filesystem stored in the 
base image and the overlay. If the file does not exist, it should be processed 
as a deleted file. Otherwise, we search the file’s data attribute or the 
corresponding data blocks in the overlay according to the attribute’s type. If 
the corresponding blocks are not allocated in the overlay, the file is not 
modified. Otherwise, we need to scan it. 
  Does it match the original hash? Does it match the original hash? 
 (a) Linux VM (b) Windows VM 
Figure 6: Checking protected file integrity in QCOW2 images of different VMs 
Handle  
abnormal files 
Obtain protected  
file path Obtain file  inode number Calculate the  inode  object address Y 
Obtain the offset  
in the overlay 
Calculate the  
new file hash 
N 
N 
N 
File is not  
modified Y 
Y 
Y Is the inode in the overlay? 
N 
Is the offset zero?  
Does the file exist? 
Handle  
abnormal files 
Obtain protected  
file path Obtain file  attributes  Calculate the data  attribute address Y 
Obtain the attribute  
offset in the overlay 
Calculate the  
new file hash 
N 
N 
N 
File is not  
modified Y 
Y 
Y Is the attribute resident? 
N 
Is the offset zero?  
Does the file exist? 
Obtain the data   
offset in the overlay 
19 
The multiple-image monitor can also be used to check the file integrity 
and detect malicious files. The methods and steps are similar to those of the 
single-image scanner described in Section 4. 
5.4. Performance and security analysis 
Compared with the single-image monitor, the multiple-image monitor 
needs scan more files in every poll, because the overlay records all of the disk 
modifications after the VM initialized. Even though a new file is checked and 
has not been modified during the sleep time, it will be checked in next 
scanning. In contrast, single-image monitor will not scan this file again, 
because the file’s blocks are not marked as dirty. However, the multipleimage 
monitor does not introduce any overhead to the target VM, because it does 
not need to trace the I/O request in real-time. As an agentless monitor, it is 
also very secure and transparent. 
6. Handling abnormal files 
After detecting the abnormal files, our system can recover and remove 
files of the protected VMs. 
6.1. Restoring protected files 
We propose a semi-automated approach to restore the modified files in 
an out-of-VM way. Besides alerting to the users, we package the original files 
in an ISO image and mount the image to the VM dynamically. Users can 
restore the files manually from the CD/DVD ROM of the VM. If the original 
files are stored in the base image, they will be fetched from the base image. 
Otherwise, they will be fetched from the backup copies. The files in CD/DVD 
ROM are non-writable, so that they cannot be tampered with. In addition, 
since the files to be restored can be in use by some processes, the manually 
restoring can ensure the VM executes properly. 
6.2. Removing malicious files 
Since malicious files may threat VM security, removing malicious files is 
very important for cloud users. Shutting down the VM to stop attacks is a 
common management approach. However, this whole-VM management 
approach is not optimal for some VMs, because they are providing services 
such as web and database services. For these VMs, the in-VM management 
approaches are better. Informing users to handle the malicious files is one of 
the in-VM management approaches. Besides, there are several agentless in-
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VM management approaches have been proposed, such as HyperShell [27] 
and EXTERIOR [28]. These approaches run in the VMM and secure VM and 
can manage VMs transparently, including removing files. But these 
management systems are complex and are difficult to be deployed in 
practical cloud environment. 
We propose an automated real-time file removing method. Our core 
method is to destroy the malicious file content and then let users delete it. 
We destroy the file content in the VM disk and memory. We first find the file 
content in the disk. After that, we rewrite the blocks with zeroes. As a result, 
the file content is destroyed in the disk. The content of the malicious file may 
also be cached in the memory because the files may be in use or have been 
used. So, we need also destroy the file cache in the VM memory. 
We leverage the VMI technique to tamper with the malicious file cache in 
the VM memory. We first find the data cache of malicious file in VM memory 
with the help of Volatility[29], which is a automated memory analysis tool. 
After that, we write these pages with zeroes. As a result, the malicious file’s 
content does not exist in the VM memory. The file can be deleted by the VM 
users because we do not destroy the file metadata. 
If the malicious files are executable malwares or malicious kernel 
modules, the VM may have already been attacked by attackers. To kill the 
malicious process or remove the rootkits, we can leverage some agentless 
security tools, such as [27] and [28]. 
7. Evaluation 
After the implementation, we evaluate the prototype system. The tests are 
performed on a machine with a 2.4GHz Intel Core i5 dual-core processor 
supporting Intel VT with 8 GB memory. The host operating system is Ubuntu 
16.04. We select an open source hypervisor - KVM with QEMU 2.8 as the 
testbed, which is widely used by cloud computing. To test the single-image 
system, we install two VMs with Ubuntu 12.04 and Windows 7 operating 
systems by using RAW image format. The disks are configured with 10 GB. 
To test the multiple-image monitor, we copy these two images as base images 
and create two corresponding overlays with QCOW2 image format. Then, we 
run another two VMs on these two overlays. All of our target VMs are 
configured with 1 VCPU and 1 GB memory. We will demonstrate the 
effectiveness and performance of our system with different VM operating 
systems and image formats in the following sections. 
7.1. Effectiveness 
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Case study 1: Checking file integrity 
Our scanner can be used to check file integrity. In Windows VM, we select 
the system critical file Host as the protected file, which is responsible for the 
mapping between domain names and their ip addresses. This file is often 
used to speed DNS resolving and block some websites. However, it is often 
tampered with by malwares to add phishing websites. To test the singleimage 
scanner, we first start the monitor, then we leverage the notpad++ to modify 
the Host file in the VM. Finally, we run the file scanner. The scanner finds that 
the HOST file has dirty blocks, which indicates that it may be modified. 
Actually, the HOST file is a new file. The notpad++ removes the original file 
and creates a new one. We do the same steps in QCOW2 VM. After the 
modification, we run the corresponding scanner, the result shows that the 
file is stored in the overlay. We can find it is modified by calculating the new 
hash of the file and comparing it with the one stored in the database. 
In Linux VMs, we select the file “/bin/login” and a user personal file as the 
protected files. The “/bin/login” file is a system file and is used as a remote 
shell, which is usually tampered with by malwares. The user personal files 
including website pages are also usually tampered with by attackers. In the 
test, we modify these two files and then scan the filesystem. For the VM with 
single image, the blocks of these files are marked as dirty. For the VM with 
QCOW2 image, the result shows that these files are stored in the overlay. 
Case study 2: Scanning malicious files 
Our scanner can also be used to scan malicious files by using the anti-
virus software to scan the newly created and modified files. In the test, we 
copy a malware (wcry.exe) to the Windows and Linux VMs, which is a popular 
malware in Windows and can be executed in Linux with wine. Our monitor 
detects the malware as new files in these filesystems. However, since our 
system can not modify the anti-virus software, we generate the modified file 
list and copy these file to a directory. Then, we use the anti-virus software to 
scan the files. The anti-virus software can mark these files as malwares. 
7.2. Performance 
Our performance test mainly focuses on the number of scanning files and 
scanning time of our system. The main advantage of our system is that our 
system can scan less files in every poll. For single-image scanner, the number 
of files to be scanned is related with how many files have been modified or 
newly created during the scanner sleeping interval. In our test, the Linux VM 
creates or modifies about 5 files per hour, and Windows VM has 25 dirty files 
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per hour. The number may be very different according to different VMs with 
different services. But compared with the total number of VM files (more 
than 10,000), this number is very small. For multiple-image VMs, the number 
indicates how many files have been modified or newly created since the VM 
is initialized. The numbers of our Windows and Linux VMs are 10,072 and 
5,691 respectively. These numbers may also be very different among 
different VMs. In addition, the number of files in overlay is always growing. 
Therefore, the performance of multiple-image scanner will be reduced with 
the execution of VM. 
Detecting malicious files is a very important and common function of 
most anti-virus security tools. We test the performance of detecting 
malicious files in the whole VM filesystem with the help of ESET NOD32[30], 
which is a popular anti-virus tool. As mentioned in Section 7.1, our file 
scanner first scans the whole VM filesystem to generates the dirty file list and 
then uses anti-virus to scan the files. In this test, we mainly focus on multiple-
image VMs, because the multiple-image VMs have more dirty files to be 
scanned. In Linux VM, 4.6GB of the disk is used, which has 176,647 files. Our 
scanner uses 217 s to find all of the files in the overlays, which number is 
10,072. Then, we use NOD32 anti-virus to scan these fils, which uses 19 s. To 
compare with the traditional anti-virus software, we leverage NOD32 
installed in the VM to rescan the filesystem in an in-VM way, and the scanning 
time is 10m25s. In the Windows VM test, the disk has 47,082 files occupying 
6.8 GB. The scan results show that 5,691 of the files are in the overlay. The 
file list generating time is 134 s. Then, NOD32 uses 15 s to scan these files. To 
compare with the in-VM approach, we also leverage NOD32 to scan the VM 
filesystem. The in-VM scanning time is 273 s, which is much longer than our 
system. From the experimental results, we can find that the number of files 
in the overlay is much smaller than that of all of the files, making our system 
need less time. If we can make anti-virus software scan the target file just 
after checking the file’s status, the performance will be higher. 
We compare our system with an out-of-VM commercial method - VMware 
vShield Endpoint Data Security [12], which is a filesystem scanner for 
VMware ESXi VMs. Since the vShield Endpoint only supports Windows VMs, 
we deploy a Windows 7 VM in the VMware ESXi environment. The VM is 
configured with 20 GB disk, and 13.9 GB is used. After the VM tools is 
installed with vShield enabled, we start the data security scanning of the VM. 
During the scanning, we cannot see any result from the system. After the 
scanning is finished, we can check the log to find the start and end time of the 
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scanning. Then, we can calculate the scanning time. The shortest scanning 
time is 1h 25m, which is much longer than our system. Since we cannot 
schedule the scanning process and cannot obtain useful output information, 
it is not easy to find out why this monitor needs so much time. We guess that 
the monitor does not want the file scanning affects the VM execution, so it 
lets the VM tools work very slowly. 
7.3. Overhead 
Our single-image scanner hooks the backend driver to trace the dirty 
blocks in real-time, which will impact the performance of the target VM’s 
filesystem. Therefore, we test the overhead introduced by our modified 
backend driver in Linux VM and Windows VM. Our test focuses on the 
performance of writing, because we only hook the driver of block writing. 
We first test the performance without hooking the backend driver. We 
select IOzone [31] as the benchmark for Linux VMs, which is a popular 
filesystem benchmark and is widely used. The test file size is set to 512 MB, 
and the write speeds with different block sizes are tested. After ten times of 
measurements, we calculate the average speeds which are shown in Figure 7. 
In addition, we leverage another common benchmark, decompressing kernel 
 
Figure 7: Overhead of Linux VM filesystem 
source code, to test the performance, because the decompression writes lots 
of files with different sizes. In the test, we use time command to test the 
execution time for ten times, the average time is 25.7s. Then, we use the 
CrystalDiskMark [32] as the benchmark in Windows VM, which is also a 
popular filesystem benchmark. The benchmark automatically measures the 
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filesystem performance by using different reading and writing ways. We also 
calculate the average values of ten measurements, which are shown in Figure 
8. 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the backend driver intercepts the writing 
information and stores them in native memory, then it transfers them to the 
recorder. We set the file scanner’s polling cycle time to one hour, which is 
suitable for most situations. Before scanning, the file scanner sends a signal 
to the recorder. The recorder outputs the dirty block map in 0.2s. This time 
is very short, because the recorder has already converted the records to the 
dirty block map and stores it in memory. After receiving the signal, it only 
needs to output the map to a file. Under the monitor, we leverage IOzone to 
test the Linux VM performance with the same measurement method, which 
results are shown in Figure 7. Kernel decompression time is also measured, 
and the average value is 26.3 s. CrystalDiskMark is used to test the Windows 
VM performance under the monitor. The average speeds are shown in Figure 
8. From the results, we can find that the speeds with monitor are not always 
less than those without monitor. In some cases, the speed under monitor is 
even higher than the non-monitor one. The differences between speeds 
 
Figure 8: Overhead of Windows VM filesystem 
under monitor and speeds not under monitor are less than 3%. The results 
indicate that the performance degradation is very low, which is difficult to be 
measured. 
The overhead is low because the driver only logs the information in native 
memory when it captures the writing request. However, if the native memory 
is full, the driver needs to copy the records to the shared memory and send a 
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signal to the recorder. These operations need extra execution time. We 
leverage gettimeofday() to measure the execution time of these two 
operations for 100 times, which is about 26us in average. These operations 
are performed in every 100,000 writing requests. As a result, the extra 
overhead to every request is very low. In our test, the shared queue is long 
enough for the I/O requests. So the system does not use files to transfer data. 
But, we are also interested in its overhead. To test its overhead, we make the 
driver fork a new subprocess when the native memory is full. Then, we use 
gettimeofday() to measure the execution time of the forking operation. After 
100 measurements, the average execution time is about 101us in average. 
The overhead is higher than that of shared memory, but it is also acceptable. 
We compare our system with the system-call-based monitors, because 
hooking system calls is another common method to capture VM execution 
information. These monitors hook the VM system calls to intercept the open 
file list. In the test, we leverage Nitro [33] to capture the VM system calls. 
Nitro is a hardware-based VM system call tracker for Windows VM in KVM 
hypervisor. It modifies the MSR registers to make the VM trigger VMExit 
 
Figure 9: Linux filesystem performance comparison between RAW and QCOW2 
event when it invokes system calls. The listener running in the VMM can get 
the event and log the system call information. In the test, we only log the 
system call information of Window 7 VM and use CrystalDiskMark to test the 
performance. The results are show in Figure 8. From the results, we can find 
that the performance of system-call-based hooker is very low, that is because 
Nitro triggers lots of VMExits. The VMExit event suspends the VM execution, 
and resumes it only after the listener records all of the information. Since the 
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VM invokes system calls frequently, the system-call-based monitor reduces 
the performance significantly. 
7.4. Discussion 
As we know, analyzing the copy-on-write image does not introduce 
overhead to the target VM, so we test if we can make the single-image VM 
turn to use copy-on-write images to reduce the monitor’s overhead. To that 
end, we test the performance of VMs with different image formats. For Linux 
VM, we first run the IOzone benchmark in a Ubuntu VM with RAW image 
format. And then we run the benchmark in the same VM with QCOW2 
enabled. The test file size is set to 512 MB, and the read/write speeds with 
different block sizes are shown in Figure 9. From the results, we can find that 
the maximal performance degradation is 15% in the write case. Then, we 
leverage CrystalDiskMark to test the performance difference in Window VM. 
The results of different disk image formats are shown in Figure 10, and the 
maximal performance degradation is 6.3% in the random read case. 
 
Figure 10: Windows filesystem performance comparison between RAW and QCOW2 
From the comparison, the QCOW2 disk format actually causes the 
performance degradation, The degradation is up to 16%, which is much 
higher than the single-image monitor’s overhead. If the VMs in cloud are 
using the QCOW2 images, the CSP can use the multiple-image scanner with 
high performance. But for the clouds using RAW images, the single-image 
scanner is better. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present an out-of-VM virtual machine filesystem monitor 
framework, which can only scan the modified and newly created files to 
improve the performance. We propose a backend-driver-based scanner for 
single-image VMs and an overlay-based scanner for multiple-image VMs. In 
addition, the system can handle the abnormal files, and can be used for both 
Linux and Windows VMs. The experimental results show that the system is 
effective and the scanning performance is much better than that of the 
traditional in-VM or out-of-VM methods. The overhead of the monitor is very 
low. In the future, we will continue to improve the monitor’s performance. 
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